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ABSTRACT 
In the last decade, the integration of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) into military 
operations has grown substantially. UAS have significantly contributed to U.S. military 
tactical, operational and strategic operations. Recently, the U.S. military has made 
increasing use of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) UAS, yet none of the U.S. military 
services have a defined cybersecurity risk management process for COTS UAS. These 
systems have been susceptible to cyber attacks, leading to the May 2018 ban on the use 
of these systems across the Department of Defense (DoD). This research effort has 
developed a multi-echelon cybersecurity risk assessment process for the DoD. The 
proposed process would enable strategic, operational and tactical commanders to assess 
and communicate cybersecurity risks associated with COTS UAS. The process combined 
four steps from the Joint Risk Analysis Methodology (JRAM) framework and seven steps 
from a strategic risk business management process. This process would allow 
commanders to have an enhanced awareness of cybersecurity risks associated with COTS 
UAS operations, improved current cyber threat assessments, and tailored action plans for 
their areas of responsibility. The proposed process would help units and agencies across 
the DoD to resume their use, test and purchase of COTS UASs without the need for the 
current centralized waiver process. 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In 2011, U.S. special forces raided Osama bin Laden’s compound in northern 
Pakistan. During this operation, the military seized a significant number of written 
documents [1]. In these documents, Osama bin Laden expressed how much he feared 
drone technology and its capabilities against his terrorist organization [1]. For the 
terrorist leader, the technological superiority of his adversary limited his options for 
movement and communication. This is one illustration of how unmanned aerial systems 
(UAS) technological advancements have changed military operations today. Moreover, 
advancement, development, and modernization of current and future UAS technology 
will play a significant role in future military operations. 
As the U.S. military modernizes, the adoption of new technology remains an 
essential part of military operations. In 2018, the U.S. Army created the Army Futures 
Command as part of the Army’s modernization strategy. This strategy is centered on 
technology, scientific developments and the enhancement of commercially available 
technology that could be applicable to military operations [2]. The military focuses on not 
just engineering and developing its own technology, but on the militarization of 
commercially available technology, where benefits such as lower cost and increased 
availability often offer an advantage over Department of Defense (DoD) developed 
systems. In April 2018, the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering 
told the Senate Armed Services subcommittee that “The department is not short of 
innovators. We are short of time, and we lack expertise in adapting commercial market 
advances to military needs” [3]. While commercially available technology offers many 
advantages to the military modernization strategy, national-level concerns can result from 
cybersecurity risks associated with this technology. 
Cybersecurity risks associated with commercially available technology have 
reached national-level concerns. On December 2018, a news article from the Consumer 
News and Business Channel reported that the U.S. government is making changes to 
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national policy focused on two major Chinese companies [4]. This change in policy is a 
consequence of allegations that these companies (company 1 and company 2) are 
developing technology that may be used, on behalf of the Chinese government, to spy on 
the Americans [4]. Moreover, a similar news article reported that Poland has changed its 
national policy with respect to Chinese companies, based on allegations of Chinese 
espionage [5]. Due to these national-level concerns, policy is rapidly changing with 
respect to some commercially available technology, encouraging end users to consider 
strategic-level risk. This consideration seeks to ensure commanders are aware of the 
cybersecurity risks associated with information technology (IT) and unmanned system 
technology. Nonetheless the usage of these technologies continues to increase. 
In the last decade, the rapid increase in the capability and availability associated 
with UAS technology has enabled commanders at the tactical operational and strategic 
levels to successfully deploy these systems in their area of operations (AO) to support 
their missions. Based on the UAS Task Force Airspace Integration Integrated Product 
Team report, the DoD increased by 81% the UAS flight hours in support of Operation 
Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom missions from 2005 to 2010 [6]. The 
effectiveness of this UAS technology in the battlefield increased the DoD’s demand for 
these systems. A report from the Center for the Study of the Drone at Bard College shows 
DoD’s exponentially increasing demand for UAS [7]. The DoD’s UAS proposed budget 
for fiscal year (FY) 2019 is approximately $6.05 billion, a $1.05 billion increase from the 
requested $5 billion in FY2017 and FY2018 [7]. The proposed budget is intended to 
cover the costs for UAS combat operations and UAS mission readiness. 
For military operations where the cost of UAS technology does not justify the 
necessity of developing new military systems, commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) UASs 
have become an option for many commanders. The affordability and availability of 
COTS UAS technology have allowed commanders to acquire these systems and to 
deploy them across various AOs. However, the continued growth of reliance on these 
systems for military operations may represent a risk at all command levels in the military. 
As cyberspace enables the employment of these systems, which are themselves 
cyber physical systems, they are susceptible to cyber-attacks. The cybersecurity risks 
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associated with the COTS UAS technology can affect multiple command levels at once 
because the cyber domain has no easily delineated boundaries. While the applicability of 
rules, regulations and authorities can be limited to specific physical boundaries, a cyber-
attack can cross multiple physical boundaries at once. For example, an attacker can cross 
civilian and government boundaries at once by using the same cyber-attack techniques 
against personal or government computers. Due to this unique characteristic of the cyber 
domain and national-level concerns related to cybersecurity, the deployment of COTS 
UAS technology in military operations requires the development of a multi-echelon 
cybersecurity risk assessment process. This process should enable strategic, operational 
and tactical level commanders to communicate elements of cybersecurity risks up and 
down the chain of command for systems that are being employed. 
Currently, none of the U.S. military services have a defined cybersecurity risk 
management process for COTS UAS. In June 2018, the Marine Times reported that all 
use of COTS UAS across the DoD was banned due to cybersecurity risks associated with 
the use of COTS UAS [8]. Without a defined process, commanders do not have the 
ability to conduct an adequate cybersecurity risk assessment and make informed 
decisions for COTS UAS operations in their area of responsibility (AOR). As a result, the 
DoD immediately put in place a waiver process to allow limited use of COTS UAS 
across the DoD until the services developed a strategy to adequately assess and mitigate 
the risks associated with COTS UAS use. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The goal of this research is to identify a process that communicates relevant 
cybersecurity risks effectively across multiple echelons. The objective is to facilitate 
better informed decisions regarding cybersecurity risks associated with COTS UAS 
operations in any AOR. 
To achieve this goal, two interrelated questions are addressed: First, how can the 
strategic-level commander be made aware of the cybersecurity risks they may be 
assuming as a result of tactical-level operations of COTS UAS? Second, how can the 
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tactical-level commander be assured that the strategic-level cybersecurity risks have been 
considered when using COTS UAS? 
C. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
This work provides the DoD with a proposed cybersecurity risk management 
(CRM) process which will allow the strategic, operational and tactical level commanders 
to communicate, assess and make better informed and effective decisions for UAS 
operations in their AOR. Because cybersecurity risks can extend beyond the  
tactical-level, it is important for strategic-level commanders to have a multi-echelon 
process that will allow them to efficiently and effectively communicate their strategic-
level concerns to tactical-level commanders. This will enable commanders to assess and 
reduce the risk associated with operations of COTS UAS in their AOR. Additionally, the 
proposed process should help units and agencies across the DoD to resume their use, test 
and purchase of the COTS UAS. 
D. APPROACH 
This thesis begins with a review of the DoD’s existing cybersecurity risk 
assessment processes, policies, definitions and instructions, as well as similar CRM 
processes used by other organizations. This research focuses on COTS UAS that are 
being deployed with tactical units in support of strategic-level commands. Also, this 
research defines and identifies gaps in the implementation of the current CRM process. 
Next, a proposed multi-echelon CRM process is derived from similar strategic-level risk 
management process and modified to specifically address the use of COTS UAS. The 
proposed CRM process is validated through a hypothetical scenario. By using the 
scenario, it is possible to demonstrate how the model could be used by organizations to 
communicate relevant cybersecurity risks across multiple command levels, to assess the 
risk and develop risk mitigation action plans.  
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This chapter (I) has described the motivation for this work and its potential 
benefits with regard to COTS UAS operations. 
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Chapter II examines cybersecurity risk management through current doctrinal 
definitions, existing cybersecurity risk assessment processes, policies and instructions, as 
well as similar processes used by other organizations outside the DoD. Chapter III 
introduces a cybersecurity risk management process for COTS UAS operations in any 
given AOR. Chapter IV uses a hypothetical scenario to demonstrate how the proposed 
cybersecurity risk management (CRM) process can be used by organizations to 








This chapter begins with an examination of the DoD’s hierarchical structure, the 
current doctrinal definition of the cyberspace domain and cyberspace operations (CO), 
the existing cybersecurity risk assessment processes, policies and instructions, as well as 
similar processes used by other organizations outside the DoD. This information provides 
a comprehensive understanding of how the DoD organizes, conceptualizes and directs 
CO and CRM in support of national-level objectives. These concepts provide a better 
understanding of the DoD’s approach to CRM and supports the identification of potential 
gaps in its risk analysis methodologies in relation to UAS operations. This produces a 
foundation for the development of the proposed UAS cyber risk communication process. 
A. WARFARE AND THE CYBERSPACE DOMAIN 
The actions, planning and execution of military objectives are organized to 
support national-level objectives. Doctrinal terms and definitions allow the military to 
conceptualize doctrine for military operations in cyberspace. Furthermore, it implements 
security requirements to manage risks associated with CO. These concepts are introduced 
to better understand how the DoD organizes strategies and policies for military operations 
in the cyberspace domain. 
1. Levels of Warfare 
As defined in Joint Publication (JP) 1, the military actions used to achieve a 
national objective are expressed at three levels of warfare: strategic, operational and 
tactical [9]. These levels are interrelated and linked to specific objectives as shown in 
Figure 1. The combinations of all objectives ultimately support the national policies as 
expressed by the executive branch of the government. While there are not rigidly defined 
boundaries between the levels, they establish the framework of military operations 
planning and synchronization that allow commanders at each level to achieve their 
objective, mission and task in support of the national objective [9]. 
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Figure 1. Levels of Warfare. Source: [9] 
a. Strategic Level 
At the strategic-level, the employment of national power is synchronized to 
achieve national and multinational objectives [9]. The President establishes the policy 
and national strategic objectives that the Secretary of Defense uses to define the DoD 
strategic military objectives, that are used by the combatant commanders for theater 
strategic planning [9]. 
b. Operational Level 
The operational-level establishes the objectives used to achieve the military end-
state within the strategic objectives [9]. Commanders at this level determine deployment 
of forces and major battle operation arrangements to support operational and strategic 
objectives [9]. 
c. Tactical Level 
Activities at this level are organized to plan and execute individual battles and 
engagements to achieve the military objectives assigned to tactical units [9]. Also, at this 
level the tactical forces employ different tactics to achieve their assigned objectives [9]. 
Tactics are actions that describe how tactical forces are employed to fight. 
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2. The Cyberspace Domain
As defined in JP-3–12, cyberspace “is the domain within the information 
environment that consists of the interdependent network of IT infrastructures and resident 
data” [10]. This domain has no geographic or geopolitical boundaries. Dominance in 
cyberspace will enable U.S. military commanders to “achieve and maintain continuing 
advantages in the operational environment” [10]. The cyberspace domain is incorporated 
with “the physical domains of air, land, maritime, and space” to achieve strategic, 
operational or tactical objectives [10]. 
The cyberspace domain has become an important tool used by commanders at all 
levels to project force and presence beyond the national boundaries and achieve their 
strategic, operational and tactical objectives [10]. Also, commanders have seen how 
military operations executed in the cyber domain can be effective, less risky and more 
cost effective than operations executed in the physical domain [11]. The inclusion of 
cyberspace with other physical domains is now considered essential for many military 
operations to be successful [11]. 
a. Cyberspace Layers
To understand and facilitate the use of cyberspace as a military operational space 
the DoD has conceptualized cyberspace in layers. Each layer defines basic concepts of its 
elements as well as some of the important characteristics that are unique to each layer. 
The DoD describes cyberspace in “three interrelated layers: physical network, 
logical network, and cyber-persona” [10]. This definition simplifies the planning and 
executions of CO [10]. 
10 
 
Figure 2. Cyberspace Layers. Source: [10] 
The physical network layer is composed of the IT devices and infrastructure that 
provides an environment to save and process information [10]. Some of the unique 
characteristics of these layers are based on the private and public physical component 
ownership [10]. Because the owners of the physical devices control the access and 
security controls of the majority of the physical elements, the DoD must take into 
consideration these unique characteristics for mission planning and execution [10]. 
“The logical network layer consists of those elements of the network related to 
one another in a way that is abstracted for the physical network” [10]. This means that 
elements do not have to be necessarily connected by a specific physical element to 
address and process data [10]. For example, a cable connecting two network devices is 
considered a physical element of the network while a network protocol used to establish 
how the data travels from one physical element to another is considered the logical 
element of the network. A unique characteristic of this layer is that the logical elements 
can only be engaged with a device or program designed to create a cyberspace  
effect [10]. 
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The cyber-persona layer is where cyberspace connects to the real world and 
represents an actor or entity that is defined with data abstracted from the logical  
network [10]. This consists of network or IT user accounts that are related to an actual 
person or entity [10]. For example, the email accounts that we create are part of the 
logical network to allow email to be received and sent; however, these accounts belong to 
an individual or organization that represent the cyber-persona layer. These are unique 
characteristics of this layer that the DoD have to take into consideration for mission 
planning [10]. 
b. Military Operations in Cyberspace 
To execute military operations in cyberspace, the DoD organized a Cyber Mission 
Force (CMF) supporting three cyberspace missions: Department of Defense Information 
Networks operations, Offensive Cyberspace Operations (OCO) and Defensive 
Cyberspace Operations [10]. These operations are intended maintain the confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of the DoD information [10]. The execution of this mission is 
assigned to the United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) and its subordinate 
forces. 
To organize the CMF, the DoD organizes its forces in three main units: Cyber 
Protection Forces, Cyber National Mission Forces and the Cyber Combat Mission Force. 
The CMF units are directed by the USCYBERCOM subordinate command elements: 
Cyber National Mission Force-Headquarters, the Joint Force Headquarters-Department of 
Defense Information Network, the Joint Force Headquarters-Cyberspace, the Service 
Cyber Components Headquarters and the CMF [10]. Figure 3 shows the relationships of 
the CMF elements. 
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Figure 3. DoD Cyber Mission Forces Relationships. Source: [10]. 
The integration of the CMF to military operations allows commanders to extend 
their capabilities globally and in theater-level or joint operations [10]. Based on JP-3–12, 
commanders should effectively address the integration of the cyberspace capabilities that 
are provided by the CMF into the planning, coordination and execution of military 
operations. Additionally, the CMF structure provides commanders constant and detailed 
coordination between strategic, operational and tactical levels and can be adapted to the 
constant changes and emerging risks [10]. 
c. Cyberspace Security 
From JP-3–12, “cyberspace security are actions taken in order to prevent 
unauthorized access to, exploitation of, or damage to computers, electronic 
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communications systems, and other IT, including PIT [platform information technology], 
as well as the information contained therein, to ensure its availability, integrity, 
authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation” [10]. While “cyberspace security” is 
the term used in JP-3–12, the DoD adopts the term “cybersecurity” from the National 
Directive-54/Homeland Security Presidential Directive-23 [12], [13]. Cybersecurity is 
employed to reduce potential exploitation of military IT, hence the term can be associated 
with cyber risk when developing military plans and operations at all levels. 
The criticality of IT for military operations, planning and execution across the 
DoD and across all levels of commands makes imperative the consideration of 
cybersecurity risks across all levels in the DoD [12]. The unique characteristics of the 
cyberspace domain are such that even tactical-level vulnerabilities can present a strategic 
risk. Adversaries seek to exploit cyberspace to obtain political, economic and military 
strategic advantage over the United States [14]. These advantages can be used by 
adversaries to compromise critical infrastructure, military networks, and to deteriorate 
international political relations [14]. Moreover, the constant exposure of inherent 
vulnerabilities from IT systems and the risk of compromising DoD military operational 
capabilities require a continual risk assessment process, that will enable commanders to 
manage the revolving risk. 
Taking into consideration the potential impact of the cybersecurity risk to the 
DoD mission, the DoD has promulgated strategies, policies and directives that are 
intended to assist commanders to defend the U.S. and its interests in cyberspace [14]. 
B. STRATEGY 
The DoD strategy for military operations in cyberspace defines and prioritizes a 
set of goals to support strategic-level objectives. These goals allow the DoD to assign 
specific objectives to each of the levels of war and develop policies to support CO in this 
domain. 
The initial DoD Cyber Strategy was released on April 2015. Its intent was to 
provide a comprehensive strategy for DoD leaders. It focused on CO assessment and 
cyberspace capabilities development. As the DoD’s CMF reached full operational 
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capability (FOC) on May 2018, the DoD aimed to set specific objectives to guide the 
CMF to strengthen their cyber defense and deterrence posture. While this strategy was 
built on the DoD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace of May 2011, it introduced 
strategic objectives to build cyber capabilities beyond FOC to improve cybersecurity and 
enable effective CO [14]. 
The 2018 DoD Cyber Strategy superseded the 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy. The 
new strategy focuses on strengthening cyber capabilities and conducting CO against U.S. 
strategic threats, mainly China and Russia [15]. The strategy focuses on strategic 
competition in cyberspace and develops five objectives to defend national interests and 
promote a culture of cybersecurity across the department [15]. According to the strategy: 
These objectives ensure the Joint Force can achieve its missions in a contested 
cyberspace environment; strengthen the Joint Force by conducting cyberspace 
operations that enhance U.S. military advantages; defending U.S. critical 
infrastructure from malicious cyber activity that alone, or as part of a campaign, 
could cause a significant cyber incident; secure DoD information and systems 
against malicious cyber activity, including DoD information on non-DoD-owned 
networks; and expand DoD cyber cooperation with interagency, industry, and 
international partners. [15] 
C. POLICIES 
DoD cybersecurity policies define how the department manages and assess risks 
associated to operations in the cyberspace domain. The department uses a multi-tiered 
risk management structure and guidance to provide a risk management framework (RMF) 
to manage the risks associated to operations in cyberspace. 
The DoD Chief Information Officer establishes the department’s cybersecurity 
program using Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 8500.01. In accordance with 
this instruction, the DoD instituted its policy for the CRM process, standards and 
procedures associated with information security and defense and the integration of 
cybersecurity at all levels across the department [12]. 
The DoDI 8500.01 instructs the department to use a multi-layered risk 
management process based on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
Special Publication (SP) 800–39 and NIST SP 80-37 as shown in Figure 4 [16], [17]. 
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Additionally, to ensure that cybersecurity is incorporated throughout the IT life cycle, the 
DoD coordinates with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics [12]. This coordination ensures that cybersecurity and risk assessment happen 
as early as possible during the acquisition process. Furthermore, that they are also 
integrated into the acquisition planning, testing and evaluation process. 
Figure 4. Multi-tiered Approach to Cybersecurity Risk Management. 
Source: [16]. 
Additionally, the DoDI 8500.01 establishes the foundational guidance and 
directions for an effective CRM across the DoD [12]. 
a. Management of Risk Based on Policy
The multi-tiered risk management approach described in the DoDI 8500.01 as the 
DoD RMF describes how the DoD will manage and assess cybersecurity risks concerns 
based on the organization levels [12]. In the RMF, the risks at each tier are 
communicated and managed by decisions made at the other tiers to ensure tactical, 
operational and strategic cybersecurity risks are communicated, assessed and managed 
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across all levels. This RMF should allow commanders at all levels to maintain a clear 
view of risk decisions and awareness of cybersecurity risks in their AO [12]. 
In March 2012, the DoD officially replaced the Defense Information Assurance 
(IA) Certification and Accreditation Process with the RMF as directed by DoDI 8510.01. 
This instruction describes the RMF as an “enterprise-wide decision structure for 
cybersecurity risk management that includes and integrates DoD mission areas” [18]. 
Also, the DoDI 8510.01 identifies the responsibilities and authorities assigned to DoD 
agencies as shown in Figure 5 [18]. This structure shows a hierarchical organization 
attempt to ensure that cybersecurity risks are considered and communicated at all levels 
with the participation of the responsible DoD agencies. 
Each tier has specific roles and responsibilities in the RMF. Tier 1 provides 
coordination and deconflictions [18]. Tier 2 administrates the DoD Component RMF 
program, and Tier 3 is responsible for accountability of the RMF at the tactical-level [18]. 
 
Figure 5. Risk Management Framework Governance. Source: [18]. 
In addition, DoDI 8510.01 provides a six-step RMF process for IT that 
incorporates the DoD Acquisition Management Process into the RMF as shown in  
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Figure 6 [18]. These steps are designed to support and complement the DoD Acquisition 
Management Process to allow risk management activities to start as early as possible in 
systems life cycle [18]. 
 
Figure 6. RMF Steps. Source: [17]. 
b. Risk assessment Based on Policy 
To assess cybersecurity risks, the DoD references NIST Guide for Conducting 
Risk Assessment (NIST SP 300-30). As shown in Figure 7, this risk assessment process 
presents a framework to assess, respond to, and monitor cybersecurity risks. The 
assessment should allow the DoD’s organizations to determine the cybersecurity risk 
based on the identification of threats and vulnerabilities [19]. 
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Figure 7. Risk Assessment within the Risk Management Process. 
Source: [19]. 
D. CONDUCT OF RISK ASSESSMENT  
The NIST provides various publications describing how to manage and assess risk 
associated with information management. In addition, NIST provides a guide on how to 
apply the RMF to federal information systems (IS). This guide provides cybersecurity 
standards and technical best practice applications. Because these publications encompass 
a variety of best security practices that allow the U.S. to continually enhance 
cybersecurity capabilities against current and future cyber threats, the DoD has directed 
their use in its cybersecurity policy [12]. 
a. Managing Information Security Risk (NIST SP 800-39) 
NIST SP 800-39 presents the fundamental concepts associated with information 
security risk management. It describes risk management as “a comprehensive process that 
requires organizations to: frame the risk, assess the risk and respond to the risk” [16]. 
Figure 7 shows the requirements of the risk management process as described by NIST 
SP 800-39 and also highlights that risk management is executed as an organization-wide 
activity that ensures every level of the organization—tactical, operational and strategic—
are integrated into risk management [16]. 
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The risk management processes presented in this publication provide ideas on 
how to conceptualize the environment where risk-based decisions are made in order to 
frame the risks. It provides strategies to identify appropriate risk assessment tools, 
techniques and methodologies and the means to monitor risk over time based on threat 
and vulnerability assessments [16]. Additionally, this publication emphasizes 
bidirectional communication among all levels of an organization as an effective way to 
maintain a flexible and dynamic risk management process [16]. 
To ensure that the risk management process is included throughout all levels in an 
organization, the NIST SP 800-39 proposes a three-tiered approach as shown in Figure 4. 
At every tier, components of fundamental risk management concepts are applied. 
(1) Tier 1 
Tier 1 provides the strategic-level objectives of the organization and provides the 
other tiers with the context of risks that are carried out through the organization [16]. In 
the context of strategic-level risk management, NIST suggests that organizations at this 
tier aggregate all the risks associated with IS at the operational and tactical-levels to 
provide a better understanding of the risks associated with IS at the strategic-level 
operations [16]. 
(2) Tier 2 
Tier 2 translates the risk context provided by the Tier 1 to process and prioritizes 
missions associated to the strategic goals and objectives. Also, it identifies types of 
information and the criticality/sensitivity and establishes the security architecture to 
protect the information [16]. 
(3) Tier 3 
Tier 3 addresses decisions and activities associated with risks from the other  
tiers [16]. It also provides feedback to the other two tiers. Furthermore, it ensures any 
additional vulnerabilities and risks to the organizations are included for risk consideration 
at the other two tiers [16]. Another consideration NIST suggests for this tier is that day-
to-day operations of IS may translate to risk management at the operational-level. Based 
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on the NIST SP 800-39, “authorizing officials make follow-on risk-based decisions on 
whether or not the IS are initially authorized to operate within the designated 
environments of operation or continue to receive authorization to operate on an ongoing 
basis” [16]. 
Figure 8 shows how the risk management process is included at all levels of an 
organization. 
Figure 8. Risk Management Process Applied across the Three Tiers. 
Source: [16]. 
b. Guide for Applying the Risk Management Framework to Federal
Information Systems (NIST SP 800-37)
The NIST SP 800-37 presents the same fundamental concepts presented in NIST 
800–39. This publication combines the fundamental concepts of IS risk management and 
provides guidance on how to apply the RMF. The implementation of the RMF is 
described in six steps shown in Figure 6: “1) Categorize IS, 2) select security controls, 3) 
implement security controls, 4) assess security controls, 5) authorize security controls, 
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and 6) monitor security controls” [17]. NIST defines tasks under each of these six steps 
that are to be executed with well-defined organizational  roles [17]. This ensures that 
organizations identify and task specific roles in support of the organization’s RMF and 
that accountability is maintained across all levels in the organization. 
c. Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments (NIST SP 800-30)
NIST SP 800-30 provides a four-step process for assessing information security 
risks as shown in Figure 9 [19]. The risk assessment process is correlated to the same risk 
management fundamentals presented in NIST SP 800-37 and NIST SP 800-39 that are 
referred in the DoD Cybersecurity Directive. 
Figure 9. Risk Assessment Process. Source: [19]. 
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Based on this publication, every step has specific tasks that can be summarized 
within the key activities: “Identify key risk factors that have been identified for ongoing 
monitoring, identify the frequency of risk factor monitoring activities and the 
circumstances under which the risk assessment needs to be updated, reconfirm the 
purpose, scope, and assumptions of the risk assessment, conduct the appropriate risk 
assessment tasks, as needed and communicate the subsequent risk assessment results to 
specified organizational personnel” [19]. Because differences exist in every organization, 
these steps are flexible and only provide an abstract process that may have 
implementation variations depending on the objectives of each organization. 
E. SIMILAR PROCESSES 
Cybersecurity requirements are extended to acquisition programs. The DoD has 
released two guidebooks to incorporate cybersecurity throughout the acquisition life 
cycle. However, the complexity of threats and risks in cyberspace domain makes it 
difficult to develop a specific cybersecurity framework that will work for all 
organizations inside or outside the DoD.  
1. Cybersecurity for DoD Acquisition Programs
The DoD Program Manager’s Guidebook for Integrating the Cybersecurity RMF 
into the System Acquisition Life cycle focuses on integrating cybersecurity into the 
DoD’s acquisition programs [20]. By defining cybersecurity management roles, 
fundamental concepts and activities, this guidebook allows program managers to 
implement the RMF in the acquisition life cycle [20], including “acquisition, design, 
development, developmental testing, operational testing, integration, implementation, 
operation, upgrade, or replacement of all DoD IT supporting DoD tasks and  
missions” [12]. This guidebook includes the cybersecurity requirements for commercial 
products. 
Based on this guidebook, all “Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) cybersecurity 
products and cybersecurity-enabled products should be certified compliant with 
Committee on National Security Systems Policy 11, National Policy Governing the 
Acquisition IA and IA-Enabled Information Technology Products” [20]. In addition to 
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this guidebook, in April 2018 the DoD released the DoD Cybersecurity Test and 
Evaluation (T&E) Guidebook. Figure 10 shows how the guide aligns the acquisition life 
cycle and the RMF to six cybersecurity T&E activities for DoD acquisitions  
programs [21]. The activities are progressive and ensure consideration of cyber-related 
risks are being considered, evaluated and mitigated throughout the acquisition life  
cycle [12]. 
Figure 10. Cybersecurity T&E Phases and the Acquisitions Life 
Cycle. Source: [21]. 
2. Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity
Like the DoD, DHS refers to NIST publications to define their cybersecurity risk 
assessment frameworks. The DHS uses the Framework for Improving Critical 
Infrastructure Cybersecurity developed by NIST in 2014 [22] to assess and manage 
cybersecurity risk associated with critical infrastructure [23]. The framework is employed 
by the Critical Infrastructure Cyber Community Voluntary Program. This program, 
provides private and public sector best practices, maintains collaboration and improves 
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cyber risk management for some very different organizations such as healthcare and 
public health, emergency services, commercial businesses, critical manufacturing and 
transportation systems, etc. [23]. 
The fundamental guidelines for this framework consist of five functional areas: 
“Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover” [22], [23]. These functional areas 
allow the DHS to incorporate the fundamental principles from the NIST publications. 
Also, they provide common frameworks for different organizations’ cybersecurity needs 
based on the same fundamental cybersecurity principles. 
F. GAPS 
While the DoD’s publications define and establish the strategy, policies and 
cybersecurity requirements for military operations in the cyberspace domain, none of 
these publications specifically address COTS UAS or cyber physical systems in general. 
Nor do they define specific requirements for COTS UAS operations. As indicated by the 
May 2018 ban, and subsequent waiver process, the Secretary of Defense determined that 
these COTS UAS posed a unique cybersecurity risk. Additionally, the requirement for 
waivers to originate at the tactical (operator) level and be approved by the third highest 
(strategic) member in the DoD demonstrates the need for an efficient mechanism to 
communicate cybersecurity risk across multiple echelons within the DoD Services.  
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III. PROPOSED CYBERSECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT (CRM)
PROCESS FOR COTS UAS 
This chapter introduces a process to apply CRM to COTS UAS. It also uses the 
RMF discussed in Chapter II to derive a CRM process for COTS UAS operations. The 
proposed framework includes a new process to communicate relevant cybersecurity risks 
effectively across multiple echelons for COTS UAS operations in any AOR. This process 
is intended to provide the commanders a better understanding of the cybersecurity risks 
associated with the COTS UAS technology.  
A. MODEL APPROACH 
This approach follows the Joint Risk Analysis Methodology (JRAM). The JRAM 
is a manual that provides guidance to manage risk for the Joint Forces. The approach 
considers a cyclical communication process paired with the current DoD multi-tiered risk 
management process—frame, assess, response, monitor—combining CRM with strategic 
risk and risk-to-mission assessments to enable risk assessment across multiple  
echelons [16], [24]. As shown in Figure 11, this approach centers on communicating 
elements of risks across multiple command levels to determine if cybersecurity risks 
associated with COTS UAS operations in a specific AOR are acceptable. The CRM 
approach considers three important components of the CRM process as they might apply 
COTS UAS operations in an AOR: strategic objectives, strategic risk and risk-to-mission. 
Considering risks in the context of strategic objectives and characteristics of the cyber 
threat gives commanders a better understanding of the cybersecurity risk associated with 
COTS UAS operations. Moreover, this approach facilitates continuous data gathering and 
comprehension of the risks, including future emerging cybersecurity risks, across 
multiple levels (Figure 12) [24]. 
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Figure 11. Proposed CRM process for COTS UAS Approach. 
B. CRM PROCESS MODEL 
The JRAM framework will be adapted to create a CRM for COTS UAS [24] The 
proposed CRM process for COTS UAS combines the four major steps from the JRAM 
framework [24], shown with gray stars in Figure 12, and seven steps from the strategic 
risk business management process developed by Frigo and Anderson [25]. The 
combination of these steps is intended to allow commanders to incorporate the proposed 
process as part of any military operations planning process where COTS UAS operations 
play a significant role for missions in the AOR [24]. It is expected that this will ensure 
that commanders consider elements of strategic risk as part of the overall military 
operations risk assessment [24]. 
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Figure 12. Proposed CRM process for COTS UAS. Adapted from 
[24], [25]. 
For the proposed CRM for UAS process, national priorities and the DoD’s 
strategic objectives in the cyber domain provide the elements of risk that drive the AOR’s 
strategic objectives. For example, the following notional risk equation shows an example 
of relevant elements of cybersecurity risk—threats, vulnerabilities, impact and security 
controls—that can be used with the CRM process to communicate across multiple 
echelons and to assess risk [26]: 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 =  𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑅 𝑥𝑥 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 𝑥𝑥 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑅
𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅
Problem framing considers the AOR’s cyber threat and its potential impact to the 
military operations in the AOR. For example, if a strategic objective regarding the 
Chinese cyber threat in the AOR is considered, then the strategic risk assessment and the 
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risk-to-mission assessment will reflect elements of cybersecurity risk related to Chinese 
made technology in COTS UAS. In this case, the assessment also considers the Chinese 
adversarial characteristics which allow the commander to assess and determine the 
potential impact to the strategic, operational and tactical objectives. The information can 
then be used to identify the sources of risk, determine potential impact in the AOR, and is 
also used to conduct the strategic risk and the risk-to-mission assessments. 
The strategic risk assessment focuses on the potential impact of the AOR’s cyber 
threat to the strategic objectives. The risk-to-mission assessment is a subset of the 
operational risk. It focuses on identifying and assessing the elements of risk associated to 
UAS operations in support of tactical missions. This assessment reflects the ability of the 
tactical-level military operations to achieve their objectives without UAS support. The 
risk-to-mission assessment combines all the tactical units’ mission risks to reflect the 
overall impact on operations at the operational-level. This allows the strategic, 
operational and tactical commanders to understand and communicate how the 
cybersecurity risks connected to UAS operations might affect operations in their AOR. 
In addition, this proposed CRM process allows organizations to integrate 
additional comprehensive cybersecurity risk assessments as subsets of either of the two 
proposed risk assessments included in this model. For example, a cybersecurity risk 
assessment that focuses on assessing risks associated with IT system components, such as 
UAS avionics computer and radio components, can be included as a subset of the risk-to-
mission risk assessment. This assessment will provide additional understanding of the 
cybersecurity risk in terms of vulnerabilities. Also, it provides the potential to establish 
security controls to minimize or eradicate the potential vulnerability and reduce the risk. 
The purpose of this model is to allow leaders to make informed decisions 
regarding COTS UAS operations in any AOR. This model combines elements of risk 
from the strategic and tactical levels in a series of steps, that provides consistent 
comprehension of cybersecurity risks across all levels in the AOR. These steps are 
defined below by incorporating RMF and the strategic risk business management process 
steps with the major steps from the JRAM. 
29 
C. CYBER RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS STEPS 
The CRM process steps, illustrated as the four stars in Figure 12, are “activities 
used to assess risk comprehensively” [24]. These activities provide a consistent way to 
manage the CRMP and ensure the process is practical. They are discussed in this section. 
1. Problem Framing
This step begins by understanding the strategic objectives and the cyber threat 
characteristics in the AOR. The strategic objectives provide the elements of cybersecurity 
of national and strategic concerns that incorporate the leadership’s guidance in the AOR. 
The focus is for leaders to categorize and communicate the threat and the impact 
elements of the risk equation, that are associated with the two types of assessments—
strategic risk and risk-to-mission—and to be able to communicate and provide leadership 
guidance in the AOR. Once the elements of cybersecurity risk are identified, the data is 
organized prior to conducting the risk assessments. The data gathering can be done by 
considering information already available or by other methods such as leadership 
interviews, surveys, working groups, or current operations assessments of a cyber 
adversary [25]. 
The characteristics of the cyber threat are defined based on the adversary’s 
capabilities, intent and targeting (access) capability. The characteristics of the cyber 
threat capabilities defines the adversary’s level of expertise, resources availability, and its 
chances to “support multiple successful, continuous, and coordinated attacks” in the  
AOR [19]. The cyber threat intent defines the level to which the adversary intends to 
impact the military mission objectives, IT systems and any military supporting 
infrastructure in the AOR [19]. The cyber threat’s targeting characteristics define the 
methods used by the adversary to execute the attacks. For example, in an AOR a cyber 
threat can be describe as a sophisticated cyber expert, well-resourced, with a purpose to 
disrupt multiple organization’s cyber resources by executing persistent attacks, and with 
access to possibly critical information [19].  
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2. Risk Assessment 
The information gathered during the problem framing step helps to create the 
strategic and risk-to-mission risk profiles based on the cybersecurity risk elements from 
the risk equation [26]. While the details and complexity of the cybersecurity risk 
assessment may vary depending on the organization’s needs and their standard operating 
procedures (SOPs). The basic framework is intended to help the organization focus on the 
strategic and risk-to-mission assessments needed to create and validate an action plan. 
The contributors of the risk assessments are encouraged to provide the elements of risks 
they believe will affect strategic-level objectives and the ability to achieve operational-
level and tactical-level objectives [25]. Moreover, they should also assess the potential 
impact of the identified risk [25]. 
a. Strategic Risk 
The CJCSM 3105.01 is the Joint Staff risk reference that provides a risk 
management methodology to the Joint Force commanders “to make consistent, timely 
risk assessments and provide best military advice in support of military operations” [24]. 
Based on CJCSM 3105.01, strategic risk “is the potential impact upon the United States- 
including the U.S. population, territory, civil society, critical infrastructure, and interests - 
of current and contingency events given their estimated consequences and  
probabilities” [24]. As shown in Figure 13, the probabilities and consequences will allow 
a decision maker to determine if the risk is acceptable and determine whether to accept, 
avoid, reduce or transfer elements of the risk. [24]. 
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Figure 13. Strategic Risk Contour. Source: [24]. 
Table 1 provides the definition of the four consequences of the strategic risk 
assessment illustrated in Figure 13. 
Table 1. Strategic Risk Table. Source: [24]. 
Consequence of Event (C) 
Limited: Confined damage to strategic objectives 
Major: Considerable damage to strategic objectives 
Catastrophic: High order damage to strategic objectives 
Existential: Permanent damage to strategic objectives 
b. Risk-to-Mission
Risk-to-mission assessment has four probabilities—highly unlikely, unlikely, 
likely and very likely— and four consequences—can fully achieve all objectives, can 
achieve all critical objectives, can achieve only most critical objectives and potential 
failure/cannot achieve critical objectives— that reflect the ability of the tactical forces to 
achieve their mission objectives [24]. The risk-to-mission contour shown in Figure 14 
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allows a decision maker to determine if the risk is going to be accepted, avoided, reduced 
or transferred [16], [24]. 
Figure 14. Risk-to-Mission Contour. Adapted from [24]. 
3. Risk Judgement
This step begins with the validation of the assessments and development of the 
management action plans for the strategic risk and risk-to-mission. In this step, a decision 
maker gathers the initial risk assessments and validates them by confirming they reflect 
the most critical risks to strategic direction and tactical mission. Also, in this step a 
decision maker verifies that management action plans are developed as a fundamental 
part of the risk assessments. The decision maker ensures completeness of the risk 
management action plans to ensure that security controls, activities and plans to reduce 
some of the risks are identified [25]. Additionally, the decision maker confirms that risk 
management action plans are monitored periodically to update the strategic risk and risk-
to-mission assessments [25]. 
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4. Risk Management 
This step incorporates the resulting actions of the previous’ steps with the 
elements of cybersecurity risk from the strategic and tactical levels. The actions focus on 
maintaining a continuous CRM process that allows leaders to make better-informed 
decisions regarding COTS UAS operations. It brings together elements of risk from the 
strategic and tactical levels to allow timely and consistent comprehension of 
cybersecurity risks related to COTS UAS. The cyclical communication process allows 
commanders across all levels to frame, assess, judge and manage the risk associated with 
COTS UAS operations and the cyber threat in their AOR. Moreover, the cyclical 
communication process allows leaders to continually assess new and emerging 
cybersecurity risks in their AOR and to update current assessments associated with COTS 
UAS. 
The integrated risk matrix shown in Table 2 is a tool proposed by the JRAM to 
visualize the combined aspects risk [24]. This tool can be used with the proposed CRM 
process to communicate cybersecurity information such as cyber threat characteristics, 
risk assessments, and risk management action plan [24]. CRM process permits 
commanders at all echelons to develop a “big picture” of the overall risk assessment with 
their use of COTS UAS in their AOR [24]. This can be demonstrated in a hypothetical 
scenario that demonstrates how CRM provides increased awareness of the cybersecurity 
risks and the potential impact to military operations in the AOR. 
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Table 2. Integrated Risk Matrix. Adapted from [24]. 
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IV. APPLICATION OF THE CYBERSECURITY RISK
MANAGEMENT (CRM) PROCESS 
This chapter applies the proposed CRM process discussed in Chapter III to a 
hypothetical scenario to demonstrate how the CRM process can be used by organizations 
to communicate relevant cybersecurity risks across strategic, operational and tactical 
levels to determine the risk of COTS UAS operations. The scenario is focused on UAS 
operations where elements of the risk can be communicated to determine the overall risk 
imposed by a cyber threat. Additionally, it provides information regarding the potential 
impact to UAS operations without exposing low echelons to highly classified 
information. 
The same cyber threat can introduce different cybersecurity risk in the AOR, this 
chapter (and thesis) focuses exclusively on the impact of the cyber threat to COTS UAS 
operations. Additionally, this scenario incorporates a UAS cybersecurity risk assessment 
methodology [27] to demonstrate how cybersecurity risk assessments that consider all 
elements of the risk equation, vulnerabilities and security controls, can be incorporated 
into the CRM process. Although many other factors such as weather, platform 
characteristics and sensor limitations can affect UAS operations, this scenario only 
addresses developing assessments to cyber threats. 
A. SCENARIO 
Imagine an AOR organized as shown in Figure 15. It is composed of a  
strategic-level command and two operational commands supported by five tactical-level 
commands. The strategic objectives in this AOR aim to defend the national interest by 
deterring and defeating any adversarial aggression, operating effectively in cyberspace, 
and reducing risks to the operating forces in the AOR. 
36 
 
Figure 15. AOR Organization. 
The threats in this AOR disrupt freedom of operations in cyberspace and increase 
violent extremists’ activities have been identified. The extremist groups are organized in 
small cells operating from multiple areas across the AOR. The cyber threat is 
characterized as a mid-level nation state cyber actor with a sophisticated understanding of 
advanced penetration techniques. It is well-resourced, able to replicate and execute 
hacking examples found online, and intends to conduct cyber espionage and disrupt key 
resources across the AOR. 
The organizations that supports Strategic Commander A’s objectives are 
Operational Commander A and Operational Commander B. Each operational command 
fights in a different domain to support Strategic Commander A’s fight against the AOR’s 
threat in all domains. Operational Commander A is responsible for protecting freedom of 
maneuver throughout cyberspace from adversarial disruption. Operational Commander B 
is responsible for detecting and deterring violent extremists’ activities. There are five 
tactical-level commands: Tactical Unit AA, Tactical Unit AB, Tactical Unit BA, Tactical 
Unit BB and Tactical Unit BC. Tactical Unit AA provides intelligence support 
capabilities and Tactical Unit AB provides cyber OCO capabilities in support of 
Operational Commander A. Tactical Unit BA and Tactical Unit BB provide intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support to multiple units in the AOR deploying 
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different UAS types. Tactical Unit BC provides combat and counter improvised 
explosive device capabilities to Operational Commander B. 
While the operational commands (A and B) fight in different domains, the AOR’s 
cyber threat poses a risk to both operational commands. Therefore, communication and 
synchronization from the Strategic Commander A allows the two operational commands 
to align objectives that support all the strategic objectives against the AOR’s cyber threat. 
B. APPLYING CRM PROCESS 
1. Problem Framing
The initial step is to frame the problem. For this scenario, the AOR’s strategic 
objectives and the leadership guidance frame the problem, with emphasis on the cyber 
threat and its impact to UAS operations in the AOR. The leadership guidance is focused 
on understanding how this cyber threat impacts military objectives that are mainly 
supported by UAS. The strategic-level command organizes the information along with 
the characteristics of the cyber threat. It then relays the information to the operational and 
tactical level, which is shown in Table 3.  
Table 3. Scenario Problem Framing. 
Event Title: Cyber Threat Impact to UAS Operations 
Purpose: Determine the impact of the AOR’s cyber threat to UAS operations. 
Cyber Threat Characteristics: Mid-level nation state cyber actor that has 
sophisticated understanding of advanced penetration techniques, is well-resourced, is 
capable of replicating and executing hacking examples found, and intends to conduct 
cyber espionage and disrupt multiple organizations’ key resources. 
The CRM process focuses on assessing strategic risk and risk-to-mission based on 
impact to mission objectives. This information can also be used in conjunction with the 
risk equation to gather additional information. Furthermore, it can incorporate other 
elements of risk such as vulnerabilities to control systems. For example, in addition to the 
strategic risk and risk-to-mission, if the operation is incorporating cybersecurity risk 
assessments from equipment operators at the tactical-level, more specific variables will 
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be incorporated to better assess the overall cybersecurity risk, such as the UAS operators’ 
cybersecurity risk assessment [27]. Likewise, additional components of risk can be added 
in when calculating risk, depending on the situation and capabilities being used to 
conduct military operations. Also, this information is being evaluated at different layers 
before the strategic risk and risk-to-mission assessments are completed. This increases 
each commander’s confidence in the CRM process. In addition, it provides commanders 
a better understanding of how cybersecurity risk assessment translates to overall risk of 
military operations.  
2. Risk Assessments
The next step is to conduct the risk assessments. The first assessment considered 
is the UAS operators’ cybersecurity risk assessment [27]. These assessments consider all 
elements of the risk equation and determine the overall cybersecurity risks determined by 
the UAS operators as shown in Table 4 [27]. 
Table 4. UAS Operator’s Cybersecurity Risk Assessment. Adapted 
from [27]. 




Moderate Requested platform despite higher threat 





Low Requested as a secondary platform if Drone-A 
risk is not acceptable to the overall mission. 
Using the information from these assessments, the operational commands assess 
the risk-to-mission given the impact to the military objectives supported by UAS 
operations. Considering the overall risk for Tactical Unit BA mission is moderate, the 
Operational Commander B determines that 50% of the critical objectives supported by 
UAS operations are at risk from the cyber threat, resulting in an overall risk-to-mission of 
moderate. Similarly, the Operational Commander A determines that this threat has no 
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impact to their critical objective in terms of UAS operations because they do not use 
UAS, resulting in an overall low risk-to-mission.  
Using the risk-to-mission assessments from the operational-level, the strategic 
risk assessment determines that cybersecurity risk associated to UAS operations in the 
AOR have a highly unlikely probability of occurrence. As a result, it would inflict limited 
damage to the strategic objectives, resulting in an overall low strategic risk. The next step 
is to communicate the assessment information across the organizations. 
3. Risk Judgement 
In this step, the risk assessments in each level are given to the decision makers of 
each respective level so they can develop effective action plans.  
Using the UAS operators’ cybersecurity risk assessment, Operational Commander 
B confirms that 50% of the units supporting UAS operations are at risk from the cyber 
threat, imposing a moderate risk to their objectives. Operational Commander B’s action 
plan is to deploy a different capability, with a lower overall cybersecurity risk for critical 
missions and accepts the risk for all other non-critical missions. This allows the 
commander to use cybersecurity risk factors and non-cyber related risk elements to 
decide what capability to deploy.  
The Operational Commander A confirms that no units in their AOR operate UAS, 
assessing the overall risk as low. Operational Commander A’s action plan is to report no 
impact to their critical objective in terms of UAS operations and continue with normal 
military operations. 
The Strategic Commander A confirms that risk imposed to the strategic objectives 
is low; therefore, the commander endorses the operational command’s action plans. 
4. Risk Management 
The overall risk of UAS operations in the AOR and the action plans are provided 
to all command-level risk management staff using the integrated risk assessment chart as 
shown in Table 5. This integrated risk assessment chart can include additional 
information and instructions that commanders want to communicate. For example, it can 
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communicate that cybersecurity risks will be monitored periodically. Also, any updates to 
the assessments will be conducted when new or emerging cyber threats or risks 
associated with COTS UAS are identified. 
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Table 5. AOR’s Overall Risk Assessment. Adapted from [24], [27]. 
Event Title: Cyber Threat Impact to UAS Operations in AOR 
Purpose: Determine the Impact of the AOR’s Cyber Threat to UAS Operations. 
Cyber Threat Characteristics: Mid-level nation state cyber actor with sophisticated understanding of 
advanced penetration techniques, well-resourced, capable of replicating and execute hacking examples 
found online and intends to conduct cyber espionage and disrupt multiple organization’s key resources. 
Strategic Assessment 





































Strategic Risk Notes: AOR’s cyber threat poses limited impact to strategic objectives. The operational 
commanders can accomplish all critical objectives.  
Operational Assessment 





















Can achieve  
all critical 
objectives 










Risk-to-Mission Notes: AOR’s cyber threat poses a Moderate risk to Operation Commander B’s UAS 
operations. This affects 50% of the units supporting UAS operations; however, all other tactical units can 
achieve all critical objectives. Operational Commander B will ensure deployment of capabilities with less 
risk will be deployed in support to critical missions. All other non-critical mission risk is acceptable.  
Tactical Assessment 
UAS Operator’s Assessment 
Unit Overall Risk Commander’s Notes 
Tactical Unit 
BA Moderate 
Requested platform despite higher threat assessment due to optical 
camera quality and increased endurance. 
Tactical Unit 
BB Low 
Requested as a secondary platform if Drone-A risk is not acceptable to 
the overall mission. 
Overall Risk Assessment 
Notes: AOR’s cyber threat possess a Moderate risk to Tactical Unit BA’s UAS operations. This affects 1 
of 2 (50%) Units supporting UAS operations in the AOR. All other tactical units can achieve all critical 
objectives. 
Action Plan 
Risk Management Mitigation Plan: Deployment of UAS capabilities with less risk will be deployed in 
support to critical missions. For all other non-critical missions, risk is acceptable. The cybersecurity risks 
will be monitored periodically, and assessments will be conducted when new or emerging cyber threats or 
risks associated with COTS UAS are identified. 
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This scenario highlights how continuous cybersecurity risk assessment using the 
CRM process enhances awareness of cyber risks for COTS UAS operations in support of 
military operations. This model provides a method to share, deliver and communicate 
cybersecurity risk information across multiple command levels (Figure 16). While this 
application only shows one scenario, it can apply to any situation involving IT 
operations. The information contained in Table 5 functions as a guide to provide 
commanders a method for measuring the impact of cybersecurity risk elements against 
their military objectives.  
 
Figure 16. Applying CRM process. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
A. CONCLUSIONS  
There are no DoD policies or instructions addressing the cyber risk associated 
with COTS UAS (cyber physical systems) or definitions of specific requirements for 
COTS UAS operations in the cyber domain. Moreover, no guidance exists regarding how 
commanders should measure the impact of cybersecurity risk against their military 
objectives. Since no such process currently exists, neither the strategic, operational or 
tactical-level commanders are fully aware of the cybersecurity risks they may be 
assuming from COTS UAS operations in their AOR. Furthermore, the absence of 
cybersecurity risk information across multiple echelons can result in an inaccurate 
assessment of an AOR’s cyber threat and its potential impact on military operations at the 
tactical, operational and strategic level.  
With regards to COTS UAS, the addition of the CRM process to risk assessment 
and mission planning could give commanders a better awareness of risks, a way to 
accurately assess current cyber threats, and the ability to develop more effective action 
plans for their AORs. Potentially, commanders can also use the CRM process to assess 
the risk and potential impact of cyber threats against other IT systems in their AOR.  
The flexibility of the CRM process may permit the incorporation of cybersecurity 
risk assessment to any type of risk assessment. For example, if a commander wants to 
conduct a risk assessment focused on manning, training and equipping, the CRM process 
allows the commander to also include cybersecurity risk elements related to the IT 
equipment.  
The incorporation of the CRM process may enhance current efforts to promote the 
inclusion of cybersecurity into military culture. It does so by bringing cybersecurity 
elements into military operations and the risk assessment domain. The CRM process may 
enable the inclusion of cyber operations into the military culture where traditional 
planning processes may not have always included it. The ability to include cybersecurity 
risk elements into the overall military risk assessments could enable commanders to 
44 
incorporate the cyber domain risks with the other domains—land, sea, air and space. This 
can enable the future development and implementation of policies and instructions and 
may provide a better understanding of how cybersecurity elements can be used to 
determine risk to overall military operations.  
B. FUTURE WORK    
Adapting this process into military planning, operations and exercises may require 
organizations to develop new standard SOPs, policies, and directives to assign 
responsibilities and requirements. This can limit the ability of some organizations to 
adopt this process. Consequently, future work can focus on understanding how to 
incorporate the CRM process into current operations, training and exercises to determine 
the SOPs, policies, and directives necessary for the implementation of this proposed 
model across the DoD.  
Time and additional resources may be required before benefits from adapting the 
CRM process emerge. Future work can explore the long term effect of these benefits and 
the impacts of incorporating cybersecurity elements into military operations and 
traditional risk assessment processes.  
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